Abstract-In this paper, we propose efficient and secure (string) oblivious transfer (OT 1 n ) schemes for any n ! 2. We build our OT 1 n scheme from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. The receiver's choice is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the unchosen secrets is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Some schemes achieve optimal efficiency in terms of the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that the receiver's choice is unconditionally secure. The distinct feature of our scheme is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and universally usable, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors specific to each of them. We extend our OT 1 n schemes to distributed oblivious transfer schemes. Our distributed OT 1 n schemes take full advantage of the research results of secret sharing. For applications, we present a method of transforming any (single-database) PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR protocol by slightly increasing the communication cost only.
1 n schemes to distributed oblivious transfer schemes. Our distributed OT 1 n schemes take full advantage of the research results of secret sharing. For applications, we present a method of transforming any (single-database) PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR protocol by slightly increasing the communication cost only.
Index Terms-Oblivious transfer, distributed oblivious transfer, private information retrieval. [40] proposes the concept of the two-party oblivious transfer (OT ) scheme in the cryptographic scenario. It has many flavors, such as original oblivious transfer (OT ), 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT 1 2 ), introduced in [23] , and 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT 1 n ), introduced in [10] . For OT , the sender, S, has only one secret, m, and would like to have the receiver, R, obtain m with probability 0:5. On the other hand, R does not want S to know whether it gets m or not. For OT 1 2 , S has two secrets, m 1 and m 2 , and would like to give R one of them at R's choice. Again, R does not want S to know which secret it chooses. OT 1 n is a natural extension of OT 1 2 to the case of n secrets, in which S has n secrets m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n and is willing to disclose exactly one of them to R at R's choice. OT 1 n is also known as "all-ornothing disclosure of secrets (ANDOS)" in which R is not allowed to gain combined information of the secrets, such as their exclusive-or. Essentially, all these flavors are equivalent in the information theoretic sense [9] , [12] , [17] . Oblivious transfer is a fundamental primitive for cryptography and secure distributed computation [29] , [32] and has many applications, such as private information retrieval (PIR), fair electronic contract signing, oblivious secure computation, etc. [6] , [16] , [23] .
A general approach for constructing an OT 1 n scheme is that we first construct a basis OT 1 2 scheme and then build the OT 1 n scheme by (explicitly or implicitly) invoking the basis OT 1 2 scheme for many runs, typically, n or log 2 n runs [9] , [11] , [34] . Another approach is to build an OT 1 n scheme from basic techniques directly [37] , [38] , [41] , [46] .
In this paper, we propose efficient string OT 1 n schemes for any n ! 2. We build our OT 1 n schemes from fundamental cryptographic techniques directly. The receiver's choice is unconditionally secure and the secrecy of the unchosen secrets m i , i 6 ¼ , is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. Our OT 1 n schemes are very efficient in computation and achieve optimal efficiency in terms of the number of rounds and the total number of exchanged messages for the case that R's choice is unconditionally secure. In the OT 1 n -I scheme, R needs to compute two modular exponentiations only, no matter how large n is, and S needs to compute 2n modular exponentiations. By the speedup techniques in [31] , S's computation time can be much reduced. If we assume the random oracle model, in the scheme OT 1 n -III, R needs to compute two modular exponentiations and S needs to compute three modular exponentiations only. The distinct feature of our schemes is that the system-wide parameters are independent of n and universally usable, that is, all possible receivers and senders use the same parameters and need no trapdoors (e.g., factorization of N ¼ pq) specific to each of them.
We combine our OT 1 n schemes with any secret sharing scheme to form efficient distributed OT 1 n schemes [36] . In this setting, there are p servers. Each server holds partial information about the secret m i s. If R contacts t (the threshold) or more servers, it can compute m of its choice; otherwise, it cannot get any information about the secrets. Our threshold OT 1 n schemes take full advantage of the research results of secret sharing. In particular, we construct an access-structure distributed OT 1 n scheme (À-OT k n ). For applications, we present a method of transforming any (single-database) PIR protocol into a symmetric PIR (SPIR) protocol by slightly increasing communication cost, two extra messages and one extra round at most. As SPIR is equivalent to OT 1 n , this method provides an efficient reduction from PIR to OT 1 n . In particular, any computational PIR [33] in which the receiver's choice is computationally secure with efficient communication complexity can be transformed into a communication-efficient OT 1 n scheme with R's choice being computationally secure. Some communication-efficient PIR schemes have been proposed [14] , [33] .
Previous Work and Comparison
Oblivious transfer has been studied in various flavors and security models extensively (cf. [2] , [4] , [7] , [9] , [11] , [13] , [18] , [20] , [23] , [27] , [34] , [38] , [41] , [44] , [46] ). In particular, bit OT 1 2 (where m 1 and m 2 are only one-bit) attracts much attention from researchers since it is the basis oblivious transfer scheme to which string OT The reduction approach is studied in [8] , [9] , [11] , [17] , [34] . For example, a k-bit string OT 1 2 scheme can be achieved by invoking k runs of a bit OT 1 2 scheme for some , 2 18, [8] , [9] , [11] . In [34] , a string OT 1 n scheme is constructed by invoking log 2 n runs of a string OT 1 2 scheme. The generic construction is studied in [1] , [23] , [37] , [38] , [41] , [46] . The scheme in [46] is a general construction for OT 1 n based on a public-key encryption scheme with some specific properties. The receiver's choice of the scheme is computationally secure. The scheme takes Oð ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi log 2 n p Þ rounds if better efficiency for exchanged messages is desired.
Recently, an efficient two-round OT 1 n in amortized analysis was proposed in [37] . The sender uses one modular exponentiation on average for each invocation. For comparison, the scheme is indeed more efficient than ours (which needs three modular exponentiations for the sender) in computation when the scheme is invoked many times. But, the size of the system parameter of the scheme is OðnÞ, while ours is a constant, independent of n. Furthermore, our schemes can be extended to threshold oblivious transfer easily and used to transfer any PIR protocol into an SPIR protocol by slightly increasing the communication complexity. In [1] , a general methodology, based on conditional opening and the homomorphic property of a public-key encryption scheme, is proposed to construct two-round OT 1 n schemes. For the schemes, each receiver needs a pair of public and private keys. Therefore, the parameters are not universally usable.
Distributed oblivious transfer has been studied in various contexts under variant models, such as function evaluation [3] and private information retrieval [28] . In the threshold OT 1 2 scheme in [36] , the receiver and involved servers need not do public-key operations, such as modular exponentiations. For comparison, in our distributed version, the receiver and each server need one invocation of our OT 1 n scheme. In some sense, our schemes fall in the category of noninteractive oblivious transfer [4] , [44] in which the receiver selects a public key and the sender performs noninteractive oblivious transfer using the receiver's public key. The schemes in [44] are based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Each receiver R uses a specific Blum integer N that is reusable by the R only. The receiver's choice is computationally secure and the privacy of the unchosen secrets is unconditionally secure. The bit OT 1 2 scheme is extended to the bit OT 1 n scheme in which the size of the receiver's public key is OðnÞ.
Transformation from PIR to SPIR has been studied in [19] , [34] . The reduction in [34] makes a call to the basic PIR scheme and log 2 n calls to an OT 1 2 scheme. The reduction in [19] uses communication complexity polyðtÞ Á cðnÞ, where cðnÞ is the communication cost of the basic PIR scheme and t is the security parameter. For comparison, our reduction uses communication cost cðnÞ þ OðtÞ.
PRELIMINARIES
Involved parties. The involved parties are the sender S and the receiver R, which are both polynomial-time probabilistic Turing machines (PPTM). An involved party is semihonest (passive or curious) if it follows the protocol step by step, but may try to compute extra information from received messages. An involved party is malicious (or active) if it deviates from the protocol in an arbitrary way in order to get extra information. For example, a malicious party can send a message that is not of the form defined in the protocol. We consider the semihonest sender S and the semihonest/malicious receiver R.
Security model. Let m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n be the secrets of S. Since S is semihonest, it won't send secrets that are different from the claimed ones, either in content or in order. The security definition is based on computational indistinguishability. Two probability ensembles fX n g and fY n g are computationally indistinguishable if, for every PPTM distinguisher D, every polynomial pðnÞ, and sufficiently large n,
Since X n and Y n look the same for D, if D cannot compute information from X n , it cannot compute information from Y n either and vice versa.
An OT 1 n scheme should meet the following requirements [34]:
1. Correctness: The protocol achieves its goal if both R and S behave properly. That is, if both R and S follow the protocol step by step, R gets m after executing the protocol with S, where is R's choice. 2. Receiver's privacy-indistinguishability: The transcripts corresponding to R's different choices and 0 , 6 ¼ 0 , are computationally indistinguishable to S. If the transcripts are identically distributed, the choice of R is unconditionally secure. 3. Sender's privacy-compared with Ideal Model: In the Ideal Model, a trusted third party (TTP) T acts as an intermediary agent who receives S's secrets m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n and R's choice and gives m to R. Since R has no way of getting information other than m , this model is considered the most secure way to implement oblivious transfer. Therefore, we say that the sender's privacy is guaranteed if, for every possible malicious R which interacts with S, there is a simulator R 0 (a PPTM) which interacts with T such that the output of R 0 is computationally indistinguishable from the output of R.
Efficiency. We consider computation and communication efficiency. For computation efficiency, we count the most expensive modular exponentiation of computing a b mod n. The other operations, such as hashing, single multiplication, and division, are considered much cheaper. For communication efficiency, we consider both the round efficiency and message efficiency.
Proof of knowledge systems. A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) system is an interactive proof system between a prover P and a verifier V such that, on a common input y, P convinces V that it owns some secret knowledge (witness) corresponding to y without revealing any information about the secret [30] . A noninteractive ZKPK (NIZKPK) system is a ZKPK system such that P sends a message (string) to V and V verifies to determine whether to accept P 's assertion. In NIZKPK, P and V need to share a common random string, which may be publicly broadcast [45] , [43] or given by a trusted third party.
Assume that each common input y corresponds to two or more secrets. Then, a proof of knowledge system for these inputs is witness-indistinguishable (WIPK) if P , which owns a secret of the input y, convinces V of this fact and the interaction transcript is computationally indistinguishable from that if P owns another secret [25] . A WIPK is perfect (also called witness-independent PK) if the interaction transcripts corresponding to two different secrets are identically distributed.
Random oracle model. Some of our schemes use cryptographically strong hash function H. It is a common practice in security analysis of cryptography to assume that H is a truly random function, called the random oracle model [5] . The answer for each query is random, but consistent with previous queries, that is, the same queries are answered with the same hash value. Furthermore, one cannot compute the hash value except by querying the hash oracle. In practicality, H is implemented with, for example, the SHA-1 function.
Though a provably secure protocol based on the random oracle model is more efficient, the random oracle model is not realistic. It has been shown that some protocol proven secure under the random oracle model is not necessarily secure in the real situation [15] . Nevertheless, the counterexample in [15] is artificial. The random oracle model is widely used in security analysis of cryptography.
Diffie-Hellman assumptions. Let G q be a group of order q and g be a generator of G q , where q is prime. Any element in G q n f1g is a generator of G q . Hereafter, all operations are over G q whenever clear. Typically, G q is the set of quadratic residues of Z Ã p , where p ¼ 2q þ 1 is also prime. In this case, the exponentiation g x mod p is denoted as g x , x 2 Z q . Let x 2 R X denote that x is chosen uniformly and independently from the set X. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is that the following two distribution ensembles, indexed on G q , are computationally indistinguishable:
. Y 1 ¼ fðg; g a ; g b ; g ab Þg Gq , where g 2 R G q n f1g and a; b 2 R Z q ; . Y 2 ¼ fðg; g a ; g b ; g c Þg Gq , where g 2 R G q n f1g and a; b; c 2 R Z q . Note that the description of G q (in most cases, ðp; qÞ) is given to the algorithm implicitly. We also omit the security parameter t ¼ sizeðqÞ hereafter for simplicity. The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption states that no PPTM can compute g ab from given g, g a , and g b with nonnegligible probability, which decreases faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial. The DDH assumption is stronger than the CDH assumption. Also, the DDH assumption is stronger than the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption, which states that no PPTM can compute x ¼ log g y from given g and y 2 G q with nonnegligible probability.
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER AGAINST SEMIHONEST RECEIVER
We first present a basic oblivious transfer scheme with security against the semihonest receiver, which follows the protocol step by step, but tries to compute information about the unchosen secrets.
Assume an order-q group G q with a short description, where q is a large prime. Let g and h be two generators of G q such that the discrete logarithm log g h is unknown to all. As long as log g h is not revealed, g and h can be used repeatedly. The system-wide parameters ðg; h; G q Þ are used by all possible senders and receivers.
Our OT 1 n scheme with security against the semihonest receiver is as shown in Fig. 1 . Without loss of generality, we assume that all secrets m i s are in G q .
Correctness. Since c ¼ ða;
Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. This is optimal since at least R has to choose and let S know and S has to respond to R's request. R sends one message y to S and S sends n messages c i , 1 i n, to R. This is also optimal (within a constant factor of 2) by the argument for the lower bound ðnÞ of communication cost of the single-database PIR when R's choice is unconditionally secure [17] .
For computation, R needs two modular exponentiations for y and a r . Straightforwardly, S needs 2n modular exponentiations for c i , 1 i n. We can reduce the computation by using the fast exponentiation methods. 
which is X. Therefore, if D distinguishes E i and X with a nonnegligible advantage , D 0 distinguishes Y 1 and Y 2 with an advantage Á ð1 À 1=qÞ þ 1=q, where 1=q is the offset probability in Step 1. t u
Without System-Wide Parameters
We can remove the requirement of using system-wide parameters ðg; h; G q Þ. Now, S first chooses g, h and G q and sends them to R, that is, the step shown in Fig. 2 is added to the scheme. When R receives ðg; h; G q Þ, it needs to check that q is prime, g 6 ¼ 1, and h 6 ¼ 1. Otherwise, if S chooses a nonprime q and g and h of small orders, it can get information about R's choice. Note that, even if S knows log g h, R's choice is still unconditionally secure.
OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER AGAINST MALICIOUS RECEIVER
In the scheme OT 1 n -I, a malicious R may not follow Step 1 to compute y. Instead, R computes y of some special form such that it is possible to compute combined information of the secrets, such as m i È m j , i 6 ¼ j. We don't know whether such y exists. To prevent this attack, we require R to know ðr; Þ that satisfies y ¼ g r h . Two solutions are presented. One is based on the witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge (WIPK) system and the other is based on the random oracle model.
Based on WIPK
The witness set about ðy; g; hÞ contains all ðr; Þ 2 Z q Â Z q n f0g that satisfy y ¼ g r h . The WIPK-based OT 1 n scheme with security against the malicious receiver is as shown in Fig. 3 .
Since yy 0c ¼ g r h ðg
, the correctness of the scheme follows easily. For computation, R needs three modular exponentiations for y, y 0 , and a r . S needs 2n + 3 modular exponentiations for checking yy 0c 6 ¼ g z 1 h z 2 and computing c i , 1 i n. We can speed up S's computation by precomputation, as discussed in Section 3. The security is shown as follows. Proof. The value y is treated as the common input. The first three steps, with messages y 0 ; c; ðz 1 ; z 2 Þ, constitute a typical 3-round perfect WIPK system for the witnesses of y. Since y ¼ g r h , r 2 R Z q , is uniformly distributed over G q and the perfect WIPK system leaks no information about ðr; Þ unconditionally, R's choice is unconditionally secure.
For each malicious R in the real run, we construct a simulator R 0 in the Ideal Model such that the outputs of R and R 0 are computationally indistinguishable as follows: First, R 0 simulates R to the point of producing ð" y y; " y y 0 Þ. Then, R 0 randomly selects " c c 2 Z q as S's challenge and continues the simulation to get ð" z z 1 ; " z z 2 Þ. If R produces valid ð" y y; " y y 0 ; " z z 1 ; " z z 2 Þ with nonnegligible probability (taken over " c c), by the soundness property of the WIPK system, R 0 can use R as a subroutine in a resettable way to compute with overwhelming probability. If the simulation fails to produce , TTP T outputs ? (abort). The probability that TTP T outputs ? is almost equal to the probability that S aborts the protocol in Step 4. After obtaining , R 0 sends to TTP T and gets m . where k j 2 R Z q ; 1 j i, r 2 Z q , and
By the same argument as Theorem 3.2, if ðg; u; v; wÞ is from Y 1 , then X 3 is equal to X 1 ; if ðg; u; v; wÞ is from Y 2 , X 3 is equal to X 2 . Thus, D 0 , using D as a subroutine, distinguishes Y 1 from Y 2 with nonnegligible probability =n at least. This is a contradiction. Therefore, R's view and the simulation result of R 0 are computationally indistinguishable. The scheme meets the requirement of Sender's privacy. t u
The scheme OT 1 n -II takes four rounds due to the interaction nature of WIPK. We can use noninteractive ZKPK to reduce the number of rounds to two. In this case, R sends a string to prove its knowledge of ðr; Þ in y ¼ g r h in
Step 1 of the scheme OT 1 n -I. The scheme based on NIZKPK has two different points. The first is that R and S have to share a random string, which may be publicly broadcast. The second is that only conceals computationally. R's choice is only computationally secure.
Based on Random Oracle Model
We apply the technique in [37] to achieve security against the malicious receiver, assuming the random oracle model and hardness of the CDH problem. Let H be a cryptographically strong hash function. The scheme is as shown in Fig. 4 .
The correctness of the scheme follows easily. As for computation, R needs two modular exponentiations for y and a r and S needs three modular exponentiations for a, y k , and h k , where a and h k can be precomputed. The security is shown as follows. Proof. We can see that R's choice is unconditionally secure.
In the random oracle model, the malicious R has to know the whole information ðy=h i Þ k in order to query the hash oracle to get Hððy=h i Þ k ; iÞ. If R can compute two 0 . Therefore, R cannot compute both ðy=h i Þ k and ðy=h j Þ k for i 6 ¼ j with nonnegligible probability.
The following simulator R 0 for the Ideal Model outputs an indistinguishable distribution:
1. Simulate R for generating " y y; 2. Randomly select " c c i , 1 i n; 3. Simulate S on input " y y (externally without knowing m i s) to obtain " k k and compute " a a ¼ g " k k ; 4. Simulate R on input " a a and " c c i s while monitoring its queries to the hash oracle closely. If R queries ðz; jÞ and z ¼ ð" y y=h j Þ " k k (this j is ), R 0 sends j to TTP T to obtain m j and returns h ¼ " c c j È m j as the hash value Hðz; jÞ; otherwise, R 0 returns a random hash value conditioned on the consistency of previous hash values; 5. Output ð" y y; " a a; " c c 1 ; " c c 2 ; . . . ; " c c n Þ. When R queries ðz; jÞ with z ¼ ð"
k k from g " r r and g " k k without knowing either " r r or " k k, which contradicts with the hardness assumption of the CDH problem. Thus, j is the choice of R. By the above argument, no other ðð" y y=h i Þ " k k ; iÞ, i 6 ¼ j, can be queried to the hash oracle with nonnegligible probability. All other " c c i , i 6 ¼ j, are distributed correctly. Therefore, the output of R 0 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of R.t u
THRESHOLD OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
For a threshold t-out-of-p OT 1 n (or ðt; pÞ-OT 1 n ) scheme, there are three types of parties: one sender S, p servers S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . ; S p , and one receiver R. S has n secrets m 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m n . It computes shares m i;j , 1 j p, of m i , 1 i n, and distributes shares m i;j , 1 i n, to server S j , 1 j p. Then, R chooses , 1 n, and contacts any t or more servers to get information about the shares. We assume a mechanism, such as the broadcast channel, for ensuring that R contacts servers with the same request. Otherwise, R can contact a set of t servers for m and another set of t servers for m 0 . It is also possible to restrict R to contacting t servers at most. By the received information, R should be able to compute m and no others.
A ðt; pÞ-OT receives information from less than t servers, it gains no information about any m i , 1 i n. 3. Receiver's privacy: There is a threshold t 0 , t 0 ! 1, such that no coalition of less than t 0 servers can gain any information about the choice of R. The threshold t 0 should be as large as possible. 4. Security against receiver-server collusion: After R gets m , there is a threshold t 00 , 1 t 00 t, such that no coalition of less than t 00 servers and R can gain any information about any other m i , 1 i 6 ¼ n. The threshold t 00 should be as close to t as possible.
Our ðt; pÞ-OT Efficiency. The scheme takes only two rounds. R sends one message y to t servers and each contacted server S j responds with n messages c i;j , 1 i n. For computation, R needs t þ 1 modular exponentiations for y and t shares m ;jl , 1 l t, and one Lagrange interpolation for m . Each contacted server S j needs 2n modular exponentiations for c i;j , 1 i n.
Correctness. If R contacts t or more servers, it can compute t shares m ;j l of m , 1 l t. Therefore, it can compute m as shown in the scheme.
Security. Our ðt; pÞ-OT 1 n scheme has the following security properties:
1. Sender's privacy: If R contacts t or more servers, the privacy of m i , 1 i 6 ¼ n, is at least as strong as hardness of the DDH problem. (The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.) Furthermore, if R gets information from less than t servers, R cannot compute information about any m i , 1 i n. This is guaranteed by the polynomial secret sharing scheme we use. 2. Receiver's privacy is unconditionally secure. Since, for any 0 , there is r 0 that satisfies y ¼ g r 0 h 0 . Even if the servers have unlimited computing power, they cannot compute R's choice . 3. It is secure against collusion of R and t-1 servers S r 1 ; S r 2 ; . . . ; S r tÀ1 , assuming hardness of the DDH problem. Since, for R and S rl ; 1 l t À 1, the privacy of shares m i;j , i 6 ¼ , j 6 ¼ r 1 ; r 2 ; . . . ; r tÀ1 , is at least as strong as the hardness of the DDH problem, R and these t-1 servers cannot compute an y info rmation ab out o ther s ecrets m i , 1 i 6 ¼ n.
Access-Structure Oblivious Transfer
Let À ¼ f 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; z g be a monotonic access structure over We define À-OT 1 n such that R can get the secret m from the servers in an authorized set 2 À, where is R's choice. The requirements for a satisfactory À-OT 1 n are the same as those for the threshold OT 1 n schemes in Section 5. We can combine our OT 1 n -I scheme and a general secret sharing scheme S to form a À-OT 1 n -I scheme as follows:
1. Let S j obtain a share m i;j of m i by the secret sharing scheme S, 1 i n. 2. Let be an authorized set that R contacts its servers to obtain m . When R contacts S j 2 with y ¼ g r h , S j responds with c i;j ¼ ðg ki;j ; m i;j ðy=h i Þ ki;j Þ, 1 i n. 3. R computes m ;j for each S j 2 and applies SðÞ to compute m .
TRANSFORMATION OF PIR TO SPIR
One primary application of our techniques is a reduction from (single-database) private information retrieval (PIR) to symmetric PIR (SPIR). In PIR, a user U queries one data block from a database, but U does not want the database manager (DBM) to know which data block he is interested in [16] . PIR does not restrict U to obtain only one data block from the database. In SPIR, the DBM just releases the data block which U requests [28] . SPIR is equivalent to OT 1 n with security against the malicious receiver.
Assume that the database has n data blocks m i , 1 i m, each is in G q . The following, based on the technique of OT If U's choice of the basic PIR scheme in Step 3 is computationally secure, the transformed SPIR scheme's user privacy is computationally secure. On the other hand, if U's choice is unconditionally secure, U's choice of the transformed SPIR is unconditionally secure.
The transformed SPIR scheme uses at most one more round than that of the basic PIR scheme because Step 1 may be combined with the first step of the basic PIR. Overall, if there exists a PIR scheme with computation complexity tðnÞ, message complexity mðnÞ, and round complexity rðnÞ, there exists an SPIR scheme with computation complexity tðnÞ þ n þ 3 modular exponentiations, message complexity mðnÞ þ 2 (one for y and the other for a), and round complexity rðnÞ or rðnÞ þ 1, but with the additional assumptions of hardness of the CDH problem and the random oracle model.
We can use the technique of OT 1 n -II in the reduction so that the security is under the assumption of hardness of the DDH problem. But, it takes more time and exchanges more messages.
CONCLUSION
We have presented efficient string 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer schemes and extended them to threshold and access-structure oblivious transfer schemes for any n ! 2.
We have also presented its application on private information retrieval. It is interesting to find more applications of this construction.
For the schemes with security against the malicious receiver, three approaches are mentioned. One is based on WIPK, another is based on NIZKPK, and the other is based on the random oracle model. The one based on WIPK needs more rounds. The one based on NIZKPK needs a shared random string between the sender and the receiver. The one based on the random oracle model, though efficient and adopted in security analysis of cryptography widely, is not technically sound. It may be possible to replace the cryptographically strong hash function with a universal family of hash functions such that the random oracle model assumption is removed and the round efficiency is maintained.
